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BASIC FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the cornerstones of personal privacy in this nation
is the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreason-
able searches and seizures.' This article describes the basic
structure of Fourth Amendment analysis as set forth in United
States Supreme Court opinions. The purpose is to help read-
ers, especially law students, analyze Fourth Amendment is-
sues.
2
Despite its complexity, Fourth Amendment law can be
summarized in the following brief outline.'
Fourth Amendment: Basic Analysis
I. Preliminary questions
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1065, Columbia
University School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Project; member of
the California bar.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup.
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. Fourth Amendment law is tremendously complex. This article will not
attempt to catalogue the refinements of search and seizure law. Instead the pur-
pose is to present a simplified analytical model that will help students grasp the
basic structure of the law. For more detailed discussions of specific points, one
should read the Supreme Court's opinions or WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEI-
ZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT (1987).
3. This outline presents the traditional one-track model of Fourth
Amendment analysis. In recent years, an alternative two-track model has begun to
emerge. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Emergence of a Two-Track Fourth Amendment
Model, 15 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L REP. 33 (1988). In the new model, "limited in-
trusions" and searches and seizures based on "special needs" are analyzed on track
two using a soft, three-part reasonableness test, while other searches and seizures
are analyzed on track one, which corresponds to the traditional model.
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C. Was the harm caused by government ac-
tion?
II. On the merits: was the Fourth Amendment vio-
lated?
A. Is the Fourth Amendment applicable?
1. Did a search or seizure occur?
2. Did the search or seizure invade
claimant's rights?
B. Were Fourth Amendment requirements
met?
1. Probable cause requirement
2. Warrant requirement
3. Reasonableness requirement
III. Remedies: if the Fourth Amendment was vio-
lated, what redress is appropriate?
A. Exclusionary rule
B. Harmless error rule
C. Civil damages
Let us translate this outline into prose. A claimant seeking
redress for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation must ini-
tially meet three preliminary requirements.' First, the court
must have jurisdiction over the claim. Second, the claim must
be justiciable. Third, the conduct giving rise to the claim must
be government action. Failure to satisfy any of these require-
ments normally results in dismissal without reaching the merits
of the Fourth Amendment claim.
If claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements, the
court will proceed to the merits of the Fourth Amendment
claim. On the merits, the analysis has two components.' First,
one must determine whether the Fourth Amendment is appli-
4. These are standard preliminary requirements that apply throughout consti-
tutional law. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA
CLARA L REv. 775, 780-82 (1988).
5. The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all constitutional
limits. See Galloway, supra note - at 782-85. In applying any constitutional limit on
government action, one should ask first whether the limit is applicable-i.e., is this
the kind of government action that is subject to this limit?-and second whether
the government complied with the rules the Supreme Court has developed for
enforcing the limit. In short, the analysis on the merits of any constitutional limit
focuses on two questions: 1) applicability and 2) compliance.
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cable, i.e., whether the government conducted a "search" or
"seizure" that invaded claimant's rights. Second, one must
determine whether the search or seizure complied with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, namely, the probable
cause, warrant, and reasonableness requirements. If no search
or seizure occurred or the search or seizure complied with
applicable requirements, the Fourth Amendment was not vio-
lated, and the analysis ends.
If, on the other hand, the government conducted a search
or seizure that invaded claimant's rights, and the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment were not satisfied, a Fourth Amend-
ment violation has occurred, and one must proceed to the
question of remedies. Here the issues concern whether the
exclusionary rule applies, whether any violation of the
exclusionary rule was harmless, and what rules apply in civil
suits for damages.
The next section discusses each step of basic Fourth
Amendment analysis in more detail.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary Questions
1. Does the court have jurisdiction?
Claimant must show that the court has jurisdiction over
the claim. If jurisdiction is lacking, the court should dismiss
without deciding the Fourth Amendment claim on the merits.6
This is usually a statutory question rather than a Fourth
Amendment question. This article will assume the court has
jurisdiction.
2. Is the claim justiciable?
To qualify for a decision on the merits, the Fourth
Amendment claim must involve a justiciable controversy be-
tween adverse parties In general, this is not a problem, since
Fourth Amendment issues normally arise in clearly justiciable
6. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal courts hearing habeas
corpus petitions have no jurisdiction to decide Fourth Amendment claims which
have been fully and fairly considered in state courts).
7. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Justiciability Analysis, 30 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 911 (1990).
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cases such as criminal prosecutions or suits against police offi-
cers for civil damages.
But justiciability issues do surface occasionally in Fourth
Amendment cases. For example, the rule against advisory opin-
ions prevents federal courts from reaching Fourth Amendment
issues in cases decided on independent and adequate state
grounds.' Similarly, the Fourth Amendment claim must be
ripe and not moot.' And the party presenting the claim must
have standing.'"
3. Was the harm caused by government action?
The Fourth Amendment, like most other constitutional
limits, applies only to government action." A search or sei-
zure undertaken by a person acting in a purely private capacity
need not comply with the amendment's requirements.
a. Searches and seizures by government employees or
agents
As a general rule, searches and seizures performed by a
government employee or a person acting as a government
agent are subject to the Fourth Amendment." For example, a
search by a fire marshal or a health inspector is government
action. If the search or seizure is wholly unrelated to the
person's official duties, however, the government-action re-
quirement is not met and the Fourth Amendment does not ap-
8. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1034 (1083).
9. E.g., Pastore v. Board of License Comm'rs, 469 U.S. 238 (1985) (case
involving application of exclusionary rule at liquor license revocation proceeding
dismissed as moot because claimant had gone out of business).
10. At one time, standing was a major preliminary question in Fourth
Amendment cases. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), however, the Supreme
Court held that the rules formerly designated as "standing" rules should
henceforth be treated as part of the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim.
Thus, these rules are discussed infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
11. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Government-Action Requirement in American
Constitutional Law, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 935 (1990).
12. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)
("Mhe Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbi-
trary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative .... "); Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
13. Eg., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 ("[T]he Amendment protects against such
intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Govern-
ment.").
[Vol. 32740
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ply. For example, a sheriff's search of his child's room to gath-
er dirty clothes for the wash is not government action.
b. Searches and seizures by private persons
As a general rule, conduct by private persons is not gov-
ernment action and is therefore not subject to constitutional
restrictions. For example, searches and seizures by private
company guards or neighborhood security patrols need not
comply with Fourth Amendment requirements. There are two
possible exceptions to the general rule, however: the "public
function" exception and the "nexus" exception.
1) Public function exception
Conduct by private persons is government action if the
conduct is a public function, i.e., a function traditionally exclu-
sively reserved for the government. 4 However, since searches
and seizures have not traditionally been exclusive government
functions," the public function exception does not cover most
searches and seizures.'
6
2) Nexus exception
Conduct by private persons is government action if there
is a sufficient nexus (connection) with the government in the
form of government compulsion or substantial government
encouragement of the precise behavior claimed to violate the
Constitution.7 If, for example, a statute compels private em-
ployers to give their employees drug tests, those searches
would be government action and would have to comply with
the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, if the government en-
14. E.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
15. In earlier centuries, when no permanent police forces existed, searches
and seizures were typically conducted by private persons with constables standing
by to keep the peace. Moreover, citizens' arrests have long been permitted and
have survived into the present.
16. A case could perhaps be made that some modern searches, such as in-
spections of closely regulated industries, are exclusively public functions which are
subject to the Fourth Amendment.
17. EKg., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). "A state normally can be
held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power
or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Id. at 1004.
18. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) ("A
1992]
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courages private drug tests to such a degree that the decision
to test is attributable to the government, the Fourth Amend-
ment applies.'9
If claimant does not satisfy the three preliminary require-
ments, the claim should be dismissed without reaching the
merits of the Fourth Amendment issue. If claimant satisfies the
preliminary requirements, one may proceed to evaluate the
Fourth Amendment claim on the merits.
B. On the Merits: Was the Fourth Amendment Violated?
1. Is the Fourth Amendment applicable?
In all constitutional cases, the threshold question on the
merits is whether the action that harmed claimant is the kind
of action that is subject to the particular constitutional limit at
issue. In Fourth Amendment cases, the question is whether the
government' conducted a "search" or "seizure" that invaded
claimant's rights.' If so, the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment must be satisfied.' If not, the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply, and the analysis ends.
a. Did a search of seizure occur?
First, one must determine whether a search or seizure
occurred." More specifically, was there a search, seizure of a
railroad that complies with the provisions of Subpart C of the regulations does so
by compulsion of sovereign authority, and the lawfulness of its acts is controlled
by the Fourth Amendment."); cf. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963) (segregation of a private restaurant is government action because compelled
by state law).
19. E.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. 615 ("[W]e are unwilling to accept petitioners' sub-
mission that tests conducted by private railroads will be primarily the result of pri-
vate initiative . . . . These are clear indices of the Government's encouragement,
endorsement, and participation, and suffice to implicate the Fourth Amendment.");
c. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
20. In the rest of this article, "the government" will be used for convenience
to refer to the person conducting any search or seizure satisfying the
government-action requirement even if that person was a private party acting joint-
ly with the government or pursuant to government compulsion or encouragement.
21. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
22. Note, however, that searches occurring outside the United States are not
subject to the Fourth Amendment unless claimant had some "previous voluntary
connection with the United States." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 263 (1990).
23. The Fourth Amendment protects the people against unreasonable
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person, or seizure of a thing? The next three sections describe
the tests the Court has developed to answer these questions.
1) Did a search occur?
A "search" is an invasion of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 4 The definition has two parts. First, claimant must
have manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. Second,
the expectation of privacy must have been one that society
recognizes as reasonable or legitimate.2 ' And, of course, the
government must have "violated" the reasonable expectation of
privacy." To make these determinations, one must examine
the totality of the circumstances, taking into account such fac-
tors as the intent of the Framers, societal attitudes concerning
the degree of protection to which the particular place is enti-
tled, and the uses to which the place was put. 7 Claimant ap-
parently has the burden of proving that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy was violated.
21
.searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
24. This definition was first stated in the landmark case Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967). As the Court put it, "The Government's activities in electron-
ically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied . . . and thus constituted a 'search... ' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 353.
25. The two-part test was first stated in Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence,
which refers to "a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an ac-
tual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). The test has been approved and applied in many later
cases. As the Court put it in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), for
example, "The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb
outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if re-
spondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that
society accepts as objectively reasonable." Id. at 39. Cf. Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) ("infringe an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable"); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664 (1989) (drug tests "implicate the Fourth
Amendment, as those tests invade reasonable expectations of privacy.").
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
27. E.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
28. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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a) Did claimant manifest a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy?
The first requirement for a search is an invasion of
someone's subjective expectation of privacy. For example, leav-
ing an object in "plain view" does not manifest an expectation
of privacy, so viewing such an object is normally not a
search." Similarly, recording a speech given in a public place
is normally not a search, because the speaker does not expect
the communication to remain private.'
b) Was the expectation of privacy one that
society recognizes as reasonable?
The second requirement for a search is that the expecta-
tion of privacy must be "legitimate," i.e., "one that society is
prepared to accept as 'reasonable. ' " To determine whether
the expectation is "objectively reasonable,"32 one must analyze
the totality of the circumstances."3 The Court has identified
several factors as especially important. For example, any expec-
tation of privacy in materials left in a place "readily accessible
to ... the public" is not reasonable."' Similarly, information
voluntarily communicated to a third party is usually not pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, because any expectation
that the third party will not pass the information on to the
government is not reasonable." In other words, one assumes
29. Eg., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 132 (1990) ("If an article is al-
ready in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any inva-
sion of privacy."); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Illinois v. Andreas,
463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
30. This requirement may not apply if the government unilaterally destroys
the individual's expectation of privacy. For example, a wiretap on a dissident's
phone may be a search even though the target suspects the phone is tapped and
thus has no expectation of privacy in his calls.
31. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). As the Court put it in Cali-
fornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988), "An expectation of privacy does
not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society is prepared
to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable."
32. Id.
33. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) ("We have no talisman
that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is prepared to
accept as reasonable.").
34. Givenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
35. "This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expecta-
744 [Vol. 32
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the risk that such information will be passed on.' Whether
respondent violated any law in conducting the surveillance is
another factor to be considered." However, this factor is not
controlling." Although the Court has not defined "society" in
detail, it has indicated that the standard is "society as a whole,"
and that state law is not controlling. 9
Here are some examples. As stated before, expectations of
privacy in objects left in "plain view" are not reasonable. 0
The same is true for objects left in the "open fields."4 There-
fore viewing such objects is not a search, even if flashlights,
binoculars, or other commonly available technological devices
for enhancing the senses are employed.42 When an individual
voluntarily discloses her physical location, telephone calls, bank
records, or thoughts to another, she assumes the risk the other
person will pass the information on to the government, and
any expectation of privacy in such a situation is not reason-
able.' A search of a prison cell is not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because society is not
prepared to accept as legitimate prisoners' expectations of pri-
tion of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
36. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
37. Florida v. Riley, 489 U.S. 445 (1989) (helicopter surveillance is not a
search where conducted from a vantage point that does not violate FAA air safety
regulations). As the plurality put it, "[I]t is of obvious importance that the helicop-
ter is this case was not violating the law." Id. at 451.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (entry onto open
farm lands is not a search although it violates state criminal trespass law).
39. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988).
40. See cases cited supra note 29.
41. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294 (1987); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. at 227 (1986); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
42. E.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (using a flashlight to look into a barn
from open fields is not a search); Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (aerial
photography of factory grounds is not a search). "The mere fact that human vi-
sion is enhanced somewhat . ..does not give rise to constitutional problems." Id.
at 238. The Court has suggested in dicta, however, that technologically enhanced
surveillance may be a search if "highly sophisticated equipment not generally avail-
able to the public" is used. Id.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (use of a "beeper"
to signal physical location is not a search, at least if it does not reveal informa-
tion inside a home); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of a "pen regis-
ter" to record numbers dialed from a telephone is not a search); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (examination of an individual's bank records is not a
search); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (bugging conversations with
the consent of a participant is not a search).
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vacy in their cells." If a container has been "previously lawful-
ly searched," the "subsequent opening is not 'a search'" unless
"there is a substantial likelihood that the contents of the con-
tainer have been changed. 5" And a search of trash left on the
curb in opaque plastic bags is also not a "search."46
2) Did a seizure of a person occur?
A person is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when the government intentionally47 acts in a
way that would cause a reasonable person to conclude under
the circumstances that he is not free to leave.48 Thus, even if
the police admit they would not have allowed a suspect to
leave and the suspect believes he is not free to leave, no sei-
zure has occurred unless there is some behavior by the police
that would lead a reasonable person to believe that "his free-
dom of movement is restrained." 9 "Examples of circumstanc-
es that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not
attempt to leave, would be a threatening presence of several
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of a citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's re-
quest might be compelled."'
3) Did a seizure of a thing occur?
A thing is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment if "there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interest in that property."" The Su-
44. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
45. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983).
46. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
47. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) ("Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs 'when there is a governmental termination of move-
ment through means intentionaly applied'") (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 597 (1989)).
48. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) ('a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.");
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.").
49. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
50. Id. at 554.
51. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984), quoted with approval
746 [Vol. 32
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preme Court has not discussed this test in detail, so one can-
not be sure how far it reaches. If extended to the limit of its
logic, however, the test would mean that interception of oral
communications is not a seizure, since electronic surveillance
arguably does not interfere with the speaker's possessory inter-
est.
If there was no search of a place, seizure of a person, or
seizure of a thing, the Fourth Amendment is not applicable
and the analysis ends. If a search or seizure did occur, the
analysis continues with the next question:
b. Did the search or seizure invade claimant's rights?
For the Fourth Amendment to be applicable, claimant
must show not only that a search or seizure occurred but also
that the search or seizure invaded claimant's personal rights.2
In other words, claimants may not vicariously assert the Fourth
Amendment rights of third parties. In earlier days, a search
was held to invade claimant's rights if claimant was legitimately
on the premises searched, 3 owned the things searched or
seized,' or otherwise had a reasonable expectation of privacy
that was invaded by the government." Now the first two have
been cancelled,' and the only question is whether the govern-
ment invaded claimant's own interest rather than the interest
of some other person. This question must be answered by
considering the totality of the circumstances and determining
in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984), where the Court held that no
seizure occurred since "it cannot be said that anyone's possessory interest was in-
terfered with in a meaningful way." Id. Recent cases on the point include Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) ("a seizure deprives the individual of do-
minion over his or her . . . property."); and Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618 n.4 (defining
seizure as "meaningful interference with the employee's possessory interest").
52. The classic case on this point is Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
This requirement was at one time treated as a rule of "standing," i.e., a compo-
nent of the preliminary "justiciability" requirement, but Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in Rakas reconceptualized the analysis so that the issue became part of substantive
Fourth Amendment law. See supra note 10.
53. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
54. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
55. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
56. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (rejecting ownership as .basis for
Fourth Amendment claim); Rakas, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (rejecting presence on
premises as basis for Fourth Amendment claim).
57. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
1992]
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whether the interests in privacy, freedom of movement,
and/or possession at stake were those of claimant."
2. Were Fourth Amendment requirements met?
If claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements and
demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment is applicable, i.e.,
that the government conducted a search or seizure invading
claimant's personal rights, the next question is whether the
government complied with applicable Fourth Amendment
requirements, including the probable cause, warrant, and rea-
sonableness requirements."
a. Was the probable cause requirement satisfied?
As a general rule, searches and seizures violate the Fourth
Amendment unless supported by probable cause.' The pur-
pose of the probable cause requirement is to prevent general
searches and seizures.6' The next 'section assumes the proba-
ble cause requirement is applicable and explains how to deter-
mine whether the requirement is met. The following section
discusses exceptions to the probable cause requirement.
58. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), holding that an over-
night guest may challenge a search of his host's home. The Court stated, "[W]e
think that society recognizes that a house guest has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his host's home." Id. at 98.
59. When using the new two-track Fourth Amendment model, see supra note
4, one would proceed at this point to the "switching questions" whether the lim-
ited intrusion or special needs doctrine justifies use of the soft track-two reason-
ableness test. The traditional one-track model, used here, treats the limited intru-
sion and special needs doctrines as exceptions to the probable cause and warrant
requirements.
60. Eg., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
("Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not rea-
sonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon prob-
able cause"); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667
(1989) ("[A] search ordinarily must be based on probable cause."); Griffin v. Wis-
consin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). The Fourth Amendment only states that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
Supreme Court has held, however, that probable cause is also required, as a gen-
eral rule, for warrantless searches and seizures. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
61. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Unwelcome Guest: A Status Repoli Concern-
ing General Searhes and Seizures in 1984, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 279 (1984).
General searches and seizures include dragnet searches, mass seizures, and general
exploratory rummaging. Id. at 287-94.
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1) Definition of probable cause
"Probable cause" is information sufficient to persuade a
reasonable person that there is a "fair probability" or "substan-
tial chance" that seizable items will be found or that a person
has committed a crime.62
In making initial probable cause determinations, magis-
trates must analyze the "totality of the circumstances"' and
decide whether the information presented to them is accurate
and sufficient in amount and quality to satisfy the "fair proba-
bility" test. Although no single factor is controlling, the Su-
preme Court has identified a series of factors which should be
considered. These factors include the source's veracity, reliabil-
ity, and basis of knowledge,' and whether the information
has been corroborated.
a) Veracity
One important factor is the source's veracity or truthful-
ness.' The Court has identified several further factors which
should be considered in judging the source's veracity. First, if
the source has given prior truthful tips, that supports an infer-
ence that the current tip is true as well." Second, if the infor-
mation is a declaration against the source's interest, the infor-
62. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.13 (1983). Probable cause was
traditionally defined as sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that
evidence of crime is present or that a person has committed a crime. This was of-
ten understood to mean a probability higher than fifty percent. The Gates substan-
tial chance formulation suggests that a lower probability will suffice. The Court
has steadfastly refused to describe probable cause in terms of any specific percent-
age. It has stated, however, that the quantum of evidence is less than that needed
to make out a prima facie case and is not equivalent to the preponderance of evi-
dence/more likely than not standard common in civil cases.
63. Id. at 230, 233, 234, 238, 241.
64. As the Court put it in Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, "We agree . . . that an
informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant
in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these ele-
ments should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to
be rigidly exacted in every case ... . [T]hey should be understood simply as
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense, practical
question whether there is 'probable cause' to believe that contraband or evidence
is located in a particular place."
65. Id.
66. E.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
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mation is more likely true.67 Similarly, if giving false informa-
tion could result in sanctions, the source is less likely to lie.'
Fourth, the identity of the source is a major consideration. If
the source is an informer from the criminal milieu, veracity is
suspect.' If the source is a citizen informant such as a wit-
ness, victim, or other one-time volunteer, veracity may be vir-
tually assumed.70 If the source is a police officer, veracity will
depend on the officer's track record. Finally, if the information
is independently corroborated, that obviously suggests that the
source told the truth."
b) Reliability
Another important factor is the source's reliability." Even
a report from a truthful informant is not trustworthy unless
the informant is an accurate observer and reporter. Whether
the source has given accurate information on prior occasions is
an important consideration here.7' Again, independent cor-
roboration of some of the information supports the reliability
of the rest.
c) Basis of knowledge
Another important factor is the source's "basis of knowl-
edge,"74 i.e., how the source got the information. Again, sever-
al further factors are pertinent. First, is the information
first-hand or second-hand? First-hand observation is considered
to be the best basis of knowledge.75 In contrast, if the source
is passing on second-hand information, the magistrate should
67. E.g., United States v. Harriss, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
68. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34 (1983).
69. E.g., Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 223 (1965) ("narcotics infor-
mants, for example, whose credibility may often be suspect").
70. Jaben, 381 U.S. 214 (1965). "The Court has since proceeded as if veracity
may be assumed when information comes from the victim or a witness .
WAYNE. R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 121 (1985).
71. For a more detailed discussion of corroboration, see infra notes 79-86 and
accompanying text.
72. See supra note 64.
73. E.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213. 233 (1983); McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300 (1967).
74. See supra note 64.
75. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 ('explicit and detailed description of alleged wrong-
doing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his
tip to greater weight").
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inquire whether the original source was truthful and reliable
and had a sound basis of knowledge.76 Second, if the informa-
tion contains "sufficient detail that the magistrate may know
that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual
rumor .. ,"" then a reliable basis of knowledge may be in-
ferred. This is especially true for hard-to-predict details con-
cerning future conduct or other details that suggest a reliable
inside source." Again, independent corroboration of the in-
formation suggests that the source must have had an accurate
basis for the information given.
d) Corroboration
As already stated, the accuracy of the information given to
the magistrate may be established by independent corrobora-
tion." Obviously, if the police corroborate specific informa-
tion by independent investigation, that information is more
likely accurate. Moreover, corroboration of some details sug-
gests that other details are accurate as well.' This is especially
the case where the corroborated details concern
hard-to-predict future actions or otherwise suggest that the
source is privy to some inside channel of information concern-
76. Indeed, the magistrate should perform a complete Gates
totality-of-the.circumstances analysis for the original source and then a similar anal-
ysis for the second-hand informer to insure that the latter is truthful and reliable.
77. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
78. "Finally, the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not
just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to
future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted." Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983). "The letter-writer's accurate information as to the travel
plans of each of the Gateses was of a character likely obtained only from the
Gateses themselves, or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary
travel plans." Id. Cf Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) ("What was im-
portant was the caller's ability to predict respondent's future behavior, because it
demonstrated inside information-a special familiarity with respondent's affairs.").
79. "Our decisions applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis outlined
above have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an
informant's tip by independent police work." Gates, 462 U.S. at 241. Corrobora-
tion may help establish the source's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.
80. "(B]ecause an informant is right about some things, he is more probably
right about other facts." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 427 (1969)
(White, J., concurring), quoted with approval in Gates, 462 U.S. at 244. Cf Ala-
bama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) ("because an informant is shown to be
right about some things, he is probably right about other facts he has alleged,
including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.").
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ing the crime." Even corroboration of innocuous details may
provide some assurance that the information before the magis-
trate is accurate.
After analyzing all relevant factors, the magistrate must
make a practical, common-sense decision' whether there is a
substantial chance that evidence of crime is present at a partic-
ular place or that a particular person committed a crime. No
single factor is controlling; rather "a deficiency in one may be
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip,
by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia
of reliability."" If, based on a synthesis of all relevant factors
and circumstances, the magistrate concludes that the Gates
"fair probability" or "substantial chance" test is met, then the
probable cause requirement is met as well.
A magistrate's decision that probable cause exists is enti-
tled to "great deference."' When such a decision is chal-
lenged later in the prosecution or on appeal, de novo review is
not appropriate. Instead, the reviewing court should uphold
the magistrate's decision if the information before the magis-
trate provided a "substantial basis" for finding probable
cause.' As the Court said in Gates:
[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by
courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the
form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination of
probable cause should be paid great deference by review-
ing courts.".... [T]he traditional standard for review of
an issuing magistrate's probable-cause determination has
been that so long as the magistrate had a "substantial basis
for .... conclud[ing]" that a search would uncover evi-
dence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no
more.8
81. See supm note 78.
82. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
83. Id. at 233.
84. Id. at 236.
85. Id. This standard of review-a substantial basis for finding a probable
cause-pretty much insures that probable cause decisions will be left in the hands
of magistrates and will not be subject to serious appellate review.
86. Id., (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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2) Exceptions to the probable cause requirement
The general rule is that searches and seizures violate the
Fourth Amendment unless supported by probable cause."'
However, the general rule is subject to numerous exceptions
which will be discussed in this section.
a) Limited intrusions"
A search or seizure that is substantially less intrusive than
full searches and custodial arrests is not subject to the proba-
ble cause requirement if the government interest outweighs
the intrusion and the search or seizure is otherwise reason-
able." To determine whether a search or seizure is "substan-
tially less intrusive" and thus "limited," one must analyze the
totality of the circumstances with special emphasis on the dura-
tion of the procedure and the diligence of the police in seek-
ing to confirm or dispel the suspicion.' If the intrusion is suf-
ficiently limited and the need outweighs the harm, neither
probable cause nor a warrant is required and the search or
seizure need only satisfy the reasonableness requirement.9
87. See cases cited supra note 60.
88. The Fourth Amendment's warrant clause is inapplicable to limited intru-
sions, so neither the probable cause nor the warrant requirement is applicable.
Limited intrusions need only satisfy the reasonableness requirement. They must be
justified in their inception, justified in their scope, and conducted so that the
intrusion does not outweigh the need. Limited intrusions were the first track-two
searches recognized by the Court. See supra note 4.
89. The landmark case on this point is Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
90. "The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is clear: on
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
"[Trhe brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is
an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive
as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
709 (1983). However, a longer duration is permitted if the delay is caused by
"evasive actions" of the suspect. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 688 (1985).
"In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an
investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police dili-
gently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly . . . ." Id. at 686.
91. See infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rea-
sonableness requirement. To be reasonable, a search or seizure must be justified
in its inception, scope, and manner of execution. The Court uses a balancing test
to determine the specific test to be used for determining whether the search or
754 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
Most limited intrusions violate the Fourth Amendment
unless based on reasonable articulable suspicion, i.e., demon-
strable, objective evidence sufficient to cause a reasonable
police officer to suspect that evidence of crime may be present
or that an individual may have committed a crime." "Reason-
able suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause . . . ."" To determine whether the reasonable
articulable suspicion test is met, police and courts must analyze
the totality of the circumstances with stress on the same factors
(veracity, reliability, basis of knowledge, corroboration, etc.)
that are relevant in determining probable cause."
Reasonable articulable suspicion is required for the follow-
ing limited intrusions: investigative stops," frisks for weap-
ons,' detentions of occupants during searches of premises,"
stops of cars to check drivers' licenses and registration," bor-
der patrol stops of cars travelling near U.S. borders," tempo-
rary detention of luggage,'" and temporary detention of
mail.10
A few seizures are so minimal that they are allowed with-
out any particularized justification. For example, stopping all
seizure is reasonable.
92. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981), which states:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of
what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms
like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not
self-defining- they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of
the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has
been written is that the totality of the circumstances-the whole pic-
ture- must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the
detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
93. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 339 (1990).
94. Id. at 328; see supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
95. E.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (airport stop of suspect-
ed drug courier); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (stop to investi-
gate completed felony); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop to investi-
gate on-going possessory offense); Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop to investi-
gate imminent armed robbery).
96. Teny, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
98. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Note, however, that customs
officers may stop vessels for similar reasons even without reasonable articulable
suspicion. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
99. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
100. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
101. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
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cars at a temporary checkpoint to detect signs of intoxication
is permitted."° Similarly, the decision to stop a car at a fixed
checkpoint near a border to check for illegal aliens and the
related decision to refer the car to a secondary inspection area
for further inquiry may be made without even a reasonable
articulable suspicion.0 Moreover, the driver of a car stopped
for a traffic infraction may be ordered to step out of the
car,10 and the officer may enter the car if necessary to check
the vehicle identification number,0 5 both without particular-
ized justification.
b) Special needs"
Searches and seizures are permitted without probable
cause "when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause require-
ment impracticable.'"' 7 To determine whether the special
needs doctrine is applicable, the Court uses a two-part test.
First, the search or seizure must be supported by "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.""'8 Sec-
ond, the special needs must be such that they would be frus-
trated by the warrant and probable cause requirements, i.e.,
the special needs must "make the warrant and probable- cause
requirements impracticable."" 9
If both prongs are satisfied, the warrant clause is inappli-
cable, and the Court uses a balancing test, weighing the need
102. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). "Detention
of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satis-
faction of an individualized suspicion standard." Id. at 2485.
103. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
104. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
105. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
106. Like limited intrusions, searches and seizures based on special needs may
be analyzed on the Fourth Amendment's new "track two." See supra note 4. The
warrant clause is inapplicable, so neither probable cause nor a warrant is needed.
Searches and seizures that fall within the special needs doctrine need only be
reasonable, that is, justified in inception and scope and no more intrusive than
justified by the need.
107. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). The quote originated in
Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring in the judgment in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). It has been cited with approval in several later cases.
108. Grifin, 483 U.S. at 873, (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
109. Id.
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against the intrusion, to determine the particular standard of
reasonableness to be applied in such cases. Generally the
search or seizure need only be justified at its inception, justi-
fied in its scope, and reasonable in the sense that the need
outweighs the intrusion. The following sections discuss the
contexts in which the Court has invoked the special needs doc-
trine.
(1) Public school searches
Public school authorities may search students if they have
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the search will uncover
evidence of crime or of a violation of school rules."' Proba-
ble cause is not required because of the special need to pre-
serve school discipline in order to further educational goals
and insure the safety of students and staff."'
(2) Government workplace searches
Government supervisors may search the offices and desks
of government employees without probable cause." 2 Such
searches are permitted because of two special needs that might
be frustrated by the probable cause and warrant requirements,
the need to retrieve work-related materials efficiently and the
need to investigate work-related employee misconduct."' Ac-
cordingly, warrantless work-related searches are permitted if
the government employer has "reasonable grounds for suspect-
ing that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is neces-
110. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
111. Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in the T.L.O. case contains the semi-
nal passage later adopted by the majority as the standard statement of the "special
needs" rule: "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of inter-
ests for that of the Framers."
469 U.S. at 351.
112. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
113. "In sum, we conclude that the 'special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement make the ... probable cause requirement impracticable for
legitimate work-related, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of
work- related misconduct." Id. at 725 (citation omitted).
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sary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to
retrieve a needed file."1
4
(3) Searches of probationers and parolees
Probation officers are permitted to search the homes of
probationers without probable cause and without a warrant if
the search is conducted pursuant to reasonable administrative
regulations requiring a likelihood or suspicion that prohibited
items are present."' As the Court put it, "We think it clear
that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make
the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement
of the standard of probable cause .... ."6 The same is proba-
bly true for parolees. Such searches are justified by the special
need for close supervision designed to protect the public and
rehabilitate probationers and parolees, a need which would be
thwarted by the usual warrant and probable cause require-
ments.
(4) Closely regulated industries
Searches of businesses in closely regulated industries are
permitted without probable cause if necessary to further a
substantial government interest and if a constitutionally ade-
quate substitute for a warrant is provided."' The first ques-
tion is whether the industry is "closely regulated," i.e., "wheth-
er the 'regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and
defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help
but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic in-
spections.'""8 Relevant factors include the pervasiveness and
regularity of the regulatory scheme, the volume and number of
the regulations, and the length of time the industry has been
regulated." '
114. Id. at 726.
115. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
116. Id. at 875-76.
117. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyards); cf. Unit-
ed States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun dealers); Colonnade Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor dealers).
118. Burger, 482 U.S. at 705 n.16 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
600 (1981)).
119. Id. at 700-01.
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If the industry is closely regulated, the second question is
whether the Burger three-part test is met."0 First, there must
be a "substantial government interest." Second, the regulatory
scheme must be a "substantially effective" and "necessary"
method for furthering the government interest. Third, the
regulations must provide a "constitutionally adequate substi-
tute for a warrant." To be adequate, the substitute must give
notice of the government's authority to search and the scope
of the searches, and it must limit the discretion of government
inspectors concerning the "time, place, and scope" of the
searches.
If all these requirements are met, businesses in closely
regulated industries may be searched without a warrant and
without probable cause. Such searches are permitted even
though the "special need" is to discover evidence of conduct
which is also prohibited by criminal statutes.'
(5) Health and safety inspections
Health and safety inspections conducted pursuant to rea-
sonable legislative or administrative standards have long been
permitted without probable cause to believe the particular
house or business has any violations." The Court has recent-
ly interpreted this rule as an application of the special needs
doctrine.'
(6) Routine caretaking inventories
Under the "inventory exception," when private property
comes into the government's possession for safekeeping, the
government is permitted to search it without probable
cause.' Such searches are justified by three needs: 1) to pro-
120. Id. at 702-03.
121. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
122. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
123. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). As opposed to other "spe-
cial needs" searches, health and safety inspections must be conducted pursuant to
a warrant. See infra note 148.
124. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory of backpack found in
impounded van); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (police station inventory
of contents of shoulder bag prior to lockup); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory of personal property found in impounded car). As the
Court put it in Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371, "[I]nventory searches are now a
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tect the property, 2) to protect the government from false
theft claims, and 3) to protect the safety of the government
custodians and others." To be reasonable, inventory search-
es must be conducted pursuant to standardized administrative
guidelines.. which are "designed to produce an
inventory."'" For example, such guidelines could presumably
require opening all containers, no containers, or only those
containers which must be opened to determine their con-
tents.'" Although the Court has not yet formally listed the in-
ventory exception under the heading of "special needs," the
cases fit squarely in this category.
(7) Drug testing
Drug testing of some government employees is permitted
without probable cause and even without reasonable
suspicion.'" The special need is to deter drug use," a need
which requires random tests and would be thwarted by requir-
ing probable cause or particularized suspicion. Similarly, drug
testing of railroad employees involved in serious accidents is
permitted without probable cause because of the special need
to ensure safety.'
(8) Other special needs
The Court has used the special needs doctrine to justify
other searches without probable cause. For example, searches
in prisons do not require probable cause, because of the spe-
cial need to maintain control and enforce rules.12
well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."
125. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73; Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645-46; Oppernan, 428
U.S. at 369.
126. "Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inventories
be conducted according to standardized criteria." Beline, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6.
127. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ("The policy or practice governing
inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.").
128. Id.
129. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
The holding in Von Raab was limited to Customs Service employees seeking pro-
motions to jobs involving drug interdiction or requiring carrying a gun.
130. The need to deter drug use by Customs Service employees is particularly
high when the employees are involved in drug interdiction or carry firearms.
131. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
132. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
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The limited intrusions and special needs exceptions are so
broad that they threaten to swallow the "general rule" requir-
ing probable cause. The resulting end-run around the warrant
clause poses a significant threat to privacy rights. 3'
c) Border searches
Border searches by customs officials are permitted without
probable cause.'" The border search exception has usually
been explained on historical grounds, i.e., the framers knew of
and approved of general searches by customs officials at the
border.'" In light of recent developments, border searches
appear to fit within the special needs doctrine. The need, of
course, is to prevent the importation of harmful items into the
country.
d) Consent searches
Searches are permitted without probable cause or particu-
larized justification if based on voluntary consent of a person
with authority over the place searched"6 or a person whom
the police reasonably believe possesses such authority.' To
determine whether consent is voluntary, the Court uses a "to-
tality of the circumstances" test focusing on such factors as the
competence and mental condition of the person who consent-
ed, whether she knew of the right to refuse, whether she coop-
erated or resisted, whether she was in custody when she con-
133. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Eclipse of the Fouith Amendment: Searches and
Seizures in the Burger Court, CAcJ F. Uan.-Feb. 1990).
134. E.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). "Border searches .. .
have been considered to be 'reasonable' by the single fact that the person or item
in question had entered into our country from outside .'" Id. at 619.
135. d. at 621-22. In contrast, general searches by customs officials at places
other than the border pursuant to writs of assistance were one of the main evils
the Fourth Amendment was intended to combat.
136. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973). Persons having such authority include the owner of the
property and others having "joint access or control for most purposes." Matlock,
415 U.S. at 171 n.7. At one time, the closely regulated industries exception was
grounded on the notion that doing business in such industries automatically
amounts to consent to government inspections. Recently, however, the Court has
switched to a "special needs" analysis for that exception.
137. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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sented, and whether the police made a "claim of authority" to
search or engaged in other coercive conduct."s
e) Searches incident to arrest
The police have "unqualified authority" to search the per-
son of a custodial arrestee without probable cause. 9 Indeed,
apart from the arrest itself, no particularized basis whatsoever
is needed for such searches.4 ' The same authority extends to
searches of the passenger compartment of a car whose occu-
pant is arrested. 4' The Court has not definitively decided
whether other areas within the arrestee's immediate control
may also be searched without probable cause, but Belton sug-
gests that the answer is yes. 4 ' The area search must be "sub-
stantially contemporaneous" with the arrest,4 ' although
searches of the person incident to arrest may be deferred until
later."'
b. Was the warrant requirement satisfied?
1) Was a warrant required?
The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement varies de-
pending on whether the government action in question is a
search, a seizure of a person, or a seizure of a thing. The ensu-
ing discussion deals separately with each of these three situa-
tions.
138. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
139. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225, 229, 230, 235 (1973).
140. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend
on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situa-
tion that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the
suspect . . . . [A] search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.
Id. at 235.
141. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
142. Cf. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) ("Every arrest must be
presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer.").
143. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970).
144. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974).
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a) Searches
(1) General rule: a search warrant is re-
quired
The general rule is that warrantless searches violate the
Fourth Amendment.' Where possible, the decision to in-
vade individual privacy should be made by a neutral, detached
magistrate rather than police officers engaged in the competi-
tive enterprise of fighting crime. 4
(2) Exceptions to the search warrant re-
quirement
The Court has stated on numerous occasions that the
search warrant requirement is the general rule subject to a
few, "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions.' The excep-
145. E.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (referring to "the
general rule that warrantless searches are p:esumptively unreasonable*); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("Except in certain
well-defined circumstances, a search . . . is not reasonable unless it is accom-
plished pursuant to a judicial warrant . . . .); National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) ("[A] search must be supported, as a gen-
eral matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause . . . ."); Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (-[W]e usually require that a search be undertaken
only pursuant to a warrant . . . ."); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985)
(referring to "the general rule that a warrant must be secured before a search is
undertaken"); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) ("[I]t is a cardinal prin-
ciple that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.'"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) ("Clearly, the general re-
quirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed
with . . . ."). As Justice Jackson put it, "When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent." Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
146. As the Court put it in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983):
The essential protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, as stated in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948),
is in requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Id., at 13-14.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 240 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
147. Kg., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
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tions include most of the exceptions to the probable cause re-
quirement plus a few more that include "exigent circumstanc-
es" and the "automobile exception."
(a) Exceptions to the warrant and probable
cause requirements
All but one of the exceptions to the probable cause re-
quirement are also exceptions to- the warrant requirement.'48
Thus warrants are not needed for limited intrusions, searches
justified by special needs beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement, border searches, consent searches, and searches of
persons incident to arrest.'
(b) Exigent circumstances
Search warrants are not required where exigent circum-
stances make it impractical to get a warrant.'" Exigencies that
justify setting the warrant requirement aside include 1) the
threat of loss of evidence, 2) physical danger to police officers,
third parties, or even the suspect, and 3) danger of escape."
Exigent circumstances tend to be present in the following
kinds of cases.
(1) Searches of places incident to arrest
Warrantless searches of places "within the immediate con-
trol" of custodial arrestees are allowed because of the danger
that the arrestee will conceal or destroy evidence or grab a
weapon and use it to harm the officers or to escape. Such
searches must be "substantially contemporaneous" with the
arrest.' Despite some uncertainty, it seems likely that such
148. The sole exception is health and safety inspections, which require an ad-
ministrative search warrant. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
149. See suprm pp. 30-47.
150. E.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
151. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
152. Id. "It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a tradi-
tional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). Warrantless searches of the peoon of
a custodial arrestee are allowed even if no exigent circumstance is present.
153. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33 (1970).
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area searches are permissible even after the arrestee is safely in
custody and the exigency has disappeared.'
(2) Hot pursuit
Warrantless searches are permitted when the police are in
hot pursuit of a criminal suspect, because stopping to get a
warrant would create a danger of escape, harm to others, and
loss of evidence.'"
(c) Automobile exception
If probable cause exists to believe evidence of crime is
present, an automobile may be searched without a warrant,"
if it is 1) "being used on the highways," or 2) "readily capable
of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly
used for residential purposes.""' The scope of such a search
is "no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legiti-
mately authorize by warrant. " '8 Thus, glove compartments,
trunks, packages, and other containers found in the automo-
bile may be opened without a warrant if they are capable of
holding the evidence sought.'59 The same rule holds for other
vehicles such as mobile homes if they are "readily mobile," that
is, capable of traveling on the public highways and "the vehicle
was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that
it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle. " "6 Fac-
154. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting search of passenger
compartment of automobile even after passengers had been removed and arrest-
ed).
155. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
156. E.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The automobile ex-
ception was originally based on the exigency of mobility, i.e., the danger that the
car could be moved out of the jurisdiction while the officers seek a warrant. In
light of the government's admitted power to impound and immobilize the auto-
mobile, this justification proved specious, so the Court reconceptualized the excep-
tion, basing it on the reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles. Carney, 471
U.S. at 391-92.
157. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392.
158. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
159. Ross, 456 U.S. at 821. Note, however, that if the police have probable
cause to believe the evidence is in a specific container in the automobile rather
than in the automobile generally, they may not open the container without a war-
rant. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979).
160. Carney, 471 U.S. at 393. Thus, it may be more appropriate to refer to the
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tors to be considered in determining whether "a motor
home ... is being used as a residence" include: "its location,
whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance,
elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it
is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access
to a public road."'
6
'
This completes the discussion of the search warrant re-
quirement and its numerous exceptions. The next two sections
discuss when warrants are required for seizures of persons and
seizures of things.
b) Seizures of persons
The general rule is that warrants are not required prior to
seizures of persons. 6' Thus, for example, a warrantless arrest
based on probable cause does not normally violate the Fourth
Amendment even though a warrant could easily have been
obtained."es There are two exceptions. First, an arrest warrant
is required where entry into the arrestee's home is necessary to
make the arrest.' Second, a warrant may be required to ar-
rest a person for a misdemeanor not committed in the pres-
ence of the arresting officer.' 3  Temporary investigative
detentions ("stops") that are substantially less intrusive than
arrests are covered by the "limited intrusions" exception to the
warrant clause and are thus permitted without warrants."
automobile exception as "the vehicle exception," as the Court did in Carney, 471
U.S. at 394.
161. Id. at 394 n.3. The Court has not yet decided whether vehicles being
used as residences may be searched without a warrant. Id.
162. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Extended pretrial deten-
tion, however, must be supported by a prompt, post- arrest judicial determination
of probable cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
163. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
164. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). "[T]he Fourth Amendment has
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Id. at 590. Moreover,
even threatened loss of evidence will not justify a warrantless home entry to arrest
for a minor crime. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
165. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418 ("The cases construing the Fourth Amendment
thus reflect the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to
arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor . . . committed in his pres-
ence ... ."). Watson suggests but does not hold that the Fourth Amendment
incorporates the common law in-presence requirement.
166. See supm notes 88-105 and accompanying text.
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c) Seizure of things
The general rule is that warrantless seizures of incriminat-
ing objects in plain view are permitted.17 The officers must
be lawfully present and have probable cause to believe the
items in plain view are incriminating. However, moving the
items and copying their serial numbers in order to determine
whether they are incriminating constitutes a separate search,
which must ordinarily be supported by a warrant.69
2) Rules for issuance and execution of warrants
If a warrant is required, one must determine whether a
warrant was, in fact, obtained and whether the warrant was
properly issued and executed.
a) Issuance
Warrants must be issued by "neutral and detached magis-
trates." ' The magistrate need not be a judge or even a law-
yer but must be sufficiently competent to be "capable of deter-
mining whether probable cause exists."'
167. Eg., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971). Earlier Supreme Court cases suggested that warrantless plain
view seizures are only permitted when the discovery is "inadvertent," but the inad-
vertent discovery limitation is no longer good law. Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128 (1990). There is some authority supporting a "general rule" that seizures of
things must be authorized by a warrant. E.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The plain view doctrine is an exception to the general rule that a
seizure of personal property must be authorized by a warrant."); Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). The "plain view exception" is so broad, however,
that it swallows any such "general rule." It is less misleading to recognize that
warrantless plain view searches are the general rule.
168. Horton, 496 U.S. at 136 ("It is, of course, an essential predicate to any
valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate
the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be
plainly viewed."); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) ("The plain-view
doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer
whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and
who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activi-
ty."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) ("The seizure of property in
plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assum-
ing that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.").
169. Hkks, 480 U.S. 321.
170. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (attorney general not a
neutral and detached magistrate).
171. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972) (court clerk held
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The warrant must contain a particular description of the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized." The description of the place to be searched is suffi-
cient if "the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable
effort ascertain and identify the place intended." '" Whether
the warrant describes the things to be seized with sufficient
particularity depends on a variety of factors including whether
the police did the best they could to describe the items, wheth-
er the items are contraband, whether the items are used lawful-
ly in substantial quantities, whether other items of the same
general description are likely to be present, and whether the
articles are books or films."
41
b) Execution
The method chosen for executing a warrant is generally
left to the judgment of the officer as long as the officer's con-
duct satisfies the reasonableness requirement.'7  The Su-
preme Court has been rather permissive in this area. However,
the execution must be prompt enough so that the warrant is
not stale, i.e., probable cause must still exist at the time of exe-
cution.
c. Was the search or seizure reasonable?
The most basic Fourth Amendment requirement is that
searches and seizures be reasonable. 7 The Court has devel-
oped several tests for measuring the reasonableness of search-
es and seizures.
sufficiently competent to issue warrant for ordinance violation).
172. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
173. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 501 (1925).
174. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6 (1978).
175. See infra pp. 175-218.
176. The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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1) Was the search or seizure justified at its incep-
tion?
To be reasonable, a search or seizure must be "justified at
its inception."'" In other words, before the search or seizure
is undertaken, the government must have some demonstrable
reason for invading claimant's rights. In general, this means
that the government must have some particularized basis for
believing or suspecting that seizable evidence is present or that
claimant has committed a crime, but there are some excep-
tions.
a) The particularity requirement
As a general rule, searches and seizures are not permitted
unless the government has particularized justification for
searching a specific place or seizing a particular person or
thing.'" The particularity requirement is crucial for pre-
venting general searches and seizures.
Probable cause, of course, is sufficient to satisfy this re-
quirement.'" If the probable cause requirement is not ap-
plicable, the Court usually requires "reasonable articulable
suspicion," i.e., some identifiable facts that would lead a rea-
sonable officer to suspect that criminal activity may be afoot or
that seizable items may be present."
177. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), quoted with appiuval in New Jersey
v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
178. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) ("[S]ome
quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure.").
179. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. for a discussion of probable
cause.
180. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). As the Court put it in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), "When the balance of
interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable cause, we have usually
required 'some quantum of individualized suspicion' before concluding that a
search is reasonable." Id. at 1417. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the test used to determine whether reasonable articulable suspi-
don is present. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Court re-
ferred to the Gates "totality of the circumstances approach" for determining proba-
ble cause and then said, "The same approach applies in the reasonable suspicion
context, the only difference being the level of suspicion that must be established."
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b) Exceptions to the particularity requirement
Although "some quantum of individualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,""'1
"the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement
of such suspicion."" Indeed, the Court has approved search-
es and seizures without particularized justification on several
occasions. For example, administrative health and safety in-
spections are permitted without any basis for believing that
hazardous conditions are present in the particular home or
business.'" Similarly, routine caretaking inventories need not
be based on particularized suspicion."8 Routine traffic stops
at fixed checkpoints inside the border to look for illegal aliens
do not require particularized justification. Nor do stops of
all cars at temporary drunk driving checkpoints'6 and stops
of ships to examine registration papers.'87 Drivers of vehicles
stopped for traffic violations may be ordered to step out of
their cars without particularized justification.'" Border
searches and consent searches need not be based on probable
cause or reasonable suspicion. 9 And protective sweeps of
"spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which
an attack could be immediately launched" are permitted with-
out probable cause or reasonable suspicion."
Exceptions to the particularity requirement are permitted
only if at least one of four conditions is met. First, administra-
tive searches and seizures without particularized suspicion
must normally be conducted pursuant to standard procedures
that limit the discretion of the officials.'' Second, so-called
181. Martinez-Fuerle, 428 U.S. at 560.
182. Id. at 561; cf. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 ("[A] showing of individualized
suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed
unreasonable.").
183. See cases cited supra notes 115-123.
184. See cases cited supra notes 124-128.
185. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
186. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
187. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
188. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
189. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (border search); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent search).
190. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).
191. E.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (searches of probationers);
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (searches of closely regulated industries);
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"minimal intrusions" are permitted without particularized justi-
fication and without administrative guidelines."9 Third, the
particularity requirement may waived by consent.'" Finally,
the requirement does not apply during border searches."
2) Was the search or seizure justifled in its scope?
To be reasonable, a search or seizure must be "reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the in-
terference in the first place." 93 In other words, the scope of
the intrusion must be limited to actions reasonably likely to
achieve the initial purpose of the search or seizure. As the
Court has put it, "Such a search will be permissible in its scope
when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the ob-
jectives of the search and not excessively intrusive.""
Here are some standard corollaries of this rule. A search
for a particular object must be limited to places capable of
containing the object. For example, the government may not
search for a stolen car in a desk drawer.97 When the object
of the search is found, the search must stop."' A frisk for
weapons must ordinarily be limited to an initial pat-down of
the suspect's outer clothing; the police may not reach into the
suspect's pockets unless the pat-down reveals something that
feels like a gun or knife.' And a protective sweep incident
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory searches); Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (residential safety inspections).
192. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (orders that stopped
drivers step out of their cars); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (traffic stops at fixed checkpoints).
193. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 218.
194. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
195. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), quoted with approval in New Jersey
v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). A recent confirmation of this point is Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1990), which refers to the requirement that a
search be "circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation."
196. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 342.
197. Cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) ("Just as probable
cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not sup-
port a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that un-
documented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless
search of a suitcase.").
198. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990). "[O]nce all of the items
particularly described in a warrant have been found, the search must cease ..
Id. at 143 n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
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to an arrest must be "not a full search of the premises, but
may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where
a person may be found."'
3) Balancing test: did the invasion of privacy out-
weigh the government interest?
To determine whether a search or seizure justified in its
inception and scope is reasonable, the Court uses a balancing
test, weighing the severity of the intrusion (harm) against the
government interest (need)."' In applying the balancing test,
the Court considers the totality of the circumstances,' but
prior cases have focused on several identifiable factors.
In evaluating the intrusion, i.e., the seriousness of the
invasion of privacy, the Court has stressed: 1) the duration of
the search or seizure,"' 2) the number of persons searched
or seized,' 3) the location, especially whether the individual
was taken to the police station," s 4) the degree of intrusion
into core areas of privacy such as the home, the body, and
private writings (for example, diaries),' 5) the manner of
treatment (for example, whether deadly force was used), 7 6)
200. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335 (1090).
201. The many cases on this point include Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("the permissibility of a particular practice 'is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'") (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("[T]here can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails.").
202. E.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (requiring "careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case"); Skinner, 489 U.S.
602,619 ("What is reasonable, of course, 'depends upon all the circumstances sur-
rounding the search or seizure . . . .'") quoting United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
203. E.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984) ("Of course, a sei-
zure reasonable at its inception . . . may become unreasonable as a result of its
duration . . . ."); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981).
204. E.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
205. Summets, 452 U.S. at 702; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
206. E.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (body); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980) (home); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (probing'
into an individual's private life and thoughts).
207. E.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which held that use of
deadly force to prevent a fleeing felon's escape is unreasonable absent "probable
cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the
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the amount of inconvenience involved,' 7) whether a war-
rant was obtained,0  and 8) whether the information revealed
is limited to evidence of crime.1
In evaluating the need, the Court has focused especially
on the following factors: 1) the probability that criminal activi-
ty was present,2' 2) the seriousness of the crime, 12 3) the
reliability of the procedure in determining whether a crime
was involved, 25 4) the availability of less intrusive alterna-
tives,"1 4 5) whether a warrant was obtained,2 - and 6) wheth-
er an emergency existed involving a risk of loss of evidence, es-
cape, or harm to persons.""
The outcome of the balancing test cannot be determined
mathematically or mechanically. The courts must make a judg-
ment based on all relevant factors.1
officer or to others." Id. at 11.
208. E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (extended seizure of
traveler's luggage held unreasonable in part because of disruption of travel plans).
209. E.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The Court's reasoning is
that a search or seizure is less intrusive when a warrant has been obtained, be-
cause the warrant assures the target that the police have authority to conduct the
search or seizure and that the authority is confined by the terms of the warrant.
210. In several cases, the Court characterized intrusions as minimal because
the only information revealed was evidence of crime. United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (field test of white powder to determine whether it was
cocaine); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (sniff of luggage by dog
trained to detect drugs). Cf. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 625 (1989) (breath tests are "less intrusive" because they "reveal the level of
alcohol in the employee's bloodstream and nothing more.").
211. See Summe , 452 U.S. at 703.
212. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("the severity of the crime
at issue").
213. E., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (bullet removal surgery unrea-
sonable because the bullet might not be probative).
214. Since the Fourth Amendment does not impose a general "least restrictive
means" requirement, this factor is not decisive by itself. See Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 373 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983). Neverthe-
less, the availability of less restrictive alternatives remains one factor to be con-
sidered among others. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
215. Summen, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The fact that a magistrate issued a warrant
demonstrates that the need was sufficient to persuade a detached judicial officer.
216. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ("whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others"); Summeis, 452 U.S. at 702 ("the interest in
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers").
217. The balancing test plays a complex role in Fourth Amendment cases.
When the Court confronts a new type of search or seizure not covered by past
cases, the Justices use the balancing test to determine what standard of reasonable-
ness to apply. See supra note 201. In general, the Framers' standard requiring a
warrant and probable cause is adopted. But if the intrusion is limited or out-
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4) Did the search or seizure comply with other appli-
cable rules of reasonableness?
The Supreme Court has developed certain additional, and
more specific rules regarding the reasonableness of searches
and seizures. For example, the police must "knock and an-
nounce" before forcing open the door to a home to conduct a
search, unless exigent circumstances are present justifying an
exception to this requirement."' Traditionally, certain kinds
of searches have been considered per se unreasonable or at
least subject to a strong presumption of unreasonableness. The
classic example was searches for "mere evidence," which were
per se violations of the Fourth Amendment until the "mere evi-
dence rule" was thrown out in 1967."9 Another example,
which is still arguably good law, is the presumption that
so-called "general searches and seizures" are unreasonable.'
C. Remedies
If the preliminary requirements are met and claimant
prevails on the merits by proving that respondent conducted a
weighed by special needs, the Court may hold that the probable cause and war-
rant requirements do not apply and that the search is to be judged under some
other reasonableness test. For example, the Court may decide that a limited intru-
sion is reasonable if based on a "reasonable articulable suspicion" rather than
probable cause. When the balancing test is used to perform this kind of "switch-
ing function," it may be referred to as "definitional balancing." A classic example
of definitional balancing is Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where the
Court balanced the need for shoot-to-kill procedures against the harm and con-
cluded that the use of deadly force is unreasonable except when the fleeing felon
poses a threat to the safety of others.
In addition, the balancing test is used in an ad hoc fashion to determine whether,
in the particular case, the search or seizure was reasonable and the need out-
weighed the harm. In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), for example, the
Court ruled that bullet removal surgery was unreasonable, despite the issuance of
a warrant based on probable cause, because the intrusion outweighed the need in
the particular case in light of other evidence available and the uncertainty whether
the surgery would produce useful evidence. This kind of ad hoc balancing tends
to be formless and lacking in clear rules, but it is crucial in all Fourth Amend-
ment cases.
218. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). Typical exigencies include
danger that evidence will be destroyed and danger of physical harm to the offi-
cers.
219. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
220. See Galloway, supra note 3.
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search or seizure invading his or her rights without complying
with applicable Fourth Amendment requirements, the final
issue is what remedies are in order.
1. Exclusionary rule
The exclusionary rule, when applicable, bars courts from
admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment." ' The rule is a "judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect."' Since the rule is not "a personal constitu-
tional right,"' it is not constitutionally required in every
case, but rather is restricted to those situations in which its
remedial purpose is most effectively served. 4
To determine when the exclusionary rule applies, the
Court uses a balancing test known as cost-benefit analysis.
"Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed
in a particular case... must be resolved by weighing the costs
and benefits of preventing the use.., of... [illegally ob-
tained] evidence ... ."' The rule's major costs are interfer-
ing with the truth-seeking process, releasing guilty criminals,
and creating disrespect for the criminal justice process. The
major benefit is deterring the police from violating the Fourth
Amendment. To decide whether evidence must be excluded,
the Court "has examined whether the rule's deterrent effect
will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deter-
rence against the costs of withholding reliable information
from the truth- seeking process."
2 26
221. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Generally, the rule excludes all evidence that is "fiuit of the poisonous
tree," i.e., evidence derived from the Fourth Amendment violation. The refine-
ments of this rule, including the attenuation, independent source, and inevitable
discovery exceptions, will not be discussed in this article.
222. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), quoted with approval
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). Earlier cases based the rule in
part on considerations of judicial integrity, but the current Court has scrapped
that rationale. See id. at 921 n.22.
223. Cailandra at 348, quoted with approval in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 906 (1984).
224. Id. at 908.
225. Id. at 906-07.
226. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987), quoted with approval by both the
majority and dissenters in James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307,312 n.1, 658 (1990).
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a. Prosecution's case-in-chief
The general rule is that illegally seized evidence is inadmis-
sible in a criminal trial as part of the prosecution's case in
chief against the person whose rights were invaded. 7 In this
context, the need to deter Fourth Amendment violations out-
weighs the costs of exclusion. 8
There are two exceptions, however. First, illegally seized
evidence may be used in the prosecution's case in chief if the
police reasonably relied on a search warrant issued by a neu-
tral, detached magistrate.' Second, illegally seized evidence
may be used in the case in chief if the police reasonably relied
on a statute later held unconstitutional."s In these two situa-
tions, the Court has concluded that the costs of exclusion out-
weigh the benefits, because the exclusionary rule cannot deter
a police officer who reasonably believes his/her conduct is
legal."' Whether the reasonable reliance exception will be ex-
tended to cover warrantless searches not undertaken in reli-
ance on a statute is an open question that requires careful,
particularized cost-benefit analysis.""2
227. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). The exclusionary rule also applies in quasi-criminal forfeiture proceedings.
See infra note 239.
228. The Court may some day accept Chief justice Burger's invitation to recal-
culate the costs and benefits and repeal the exclusionary rule altogether. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting). But it has not done so yet.
229. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 397 (1984). This exception does not ap-
ply, however, if 1) the officer knowingly or recklessly misled the magistrate, 2) the
magistrate was not neutral and detached, 3) the probable cause determination is
.entirely unreasonable," 4) the warrant is facially deficient, or 5) the officers exe-
cute the warrant in an unreasonable manner. Id. at 923.
230. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31
(1979).
231. The exclusionary rule "cannot be expected and should not be applied, to
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 919 (1984).
232. One crucial benefit of exclusion in cases not involving warrants is that it
gives the police an incentive to get a warrant. That may be enough to tip the
balance in favor of exclusion.
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b. Other uses
1) Criminal prosecutions
The cost-benefit balancing test has also produced mixed
results in criminal prosecutions where the illegal evidence is
offered for purposes other than direct proof of guilt in the
prosecution's case in chief. On the one hand, the "impeach-
ment exception"' to the -exclusionary rule permits the use of
illegally seized evidence to impeach defendant's testimony.'
Similarly, illegally obtained evidence may be used to a obtain a
grand jury indictment.'" The Court has concluded that any
incremental deterrent effect in these contexts is speculative"
and that the costs outweigh the benefits.' On the other
hand, the impeachment exception does not apply to other
defense witnesses, so the exclusionary rule bars use of
defendant's illegally obtained statements to impeach a defense
witness other than defendant.'
2) Uses outside criminal prosecutions
The exclusionary rule applies in quasi-criminal forfeiture
proceedings.' The Court has declined, however, to extend
the exclusionary rule to purely civil proceedings. In such cases,
the Court has stressed that the rule's main deterrent effect
results from barring the illegal evidence from criminal prose-
cutions, that any incremental deterrent effect from extending
the rule to other proceedings is speculative and probably mini-
mal, and that the costs of exclusion outweigh the benefits.
Thus, illegal evidence may be admitted in civil tax pro-
ceedings... and deportation proceedings."' Similarly, if de-
233. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 308 (1990).
234. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62 (1954).
235. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
236. "Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending
the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best." Calandra, 414 U.S. at
351.
237. Id. at 350-52.
238. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
239. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
240. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
241. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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fendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth
Amendment claims in state courts, efforts to invoke the
exclusionary rule in later federal habeas corpus proceedings
are barred.2 '
Arguments to extend the exclusionary rule to new proce-
dural contexts face an uphill battle in the current Supreme
Court. On the cost side, the dominant conservative wing typi-
cally stresses that the "extreme sanction of exclusion " 4s is a
major impediment to the truth-seeking process, results in the
release of too many guilty criminals,244 and generates disre-
spect for the law. 4" On the benefit side, the same Justices
stress the lack of empirical evidence that the exclusionary rule
deters at all,246 the fact that the deterrent effect, if any, is
mainly achieved by excluding evidence from the prosecutor's
case in chief,4' and that any incremental deterrent effect
from extending the rule is speculative and probably mini-
mal.24 In short, the Court puts its thumb on the cost side of
the balance, and claimants will have a hard time proving suffi-
cient incremental deterrent effect to swing the scales back the
other way.
2. Harmless error rule
If evidence is admitted in violation of the exclusionary
rule and a conviction ensues, reversal is not necessary if the
error was harmless.4 ' An error is harmless if the reviewing
court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the decision is
242. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
243. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
244. Although the percentage of criminals released because of the exclusionary
rule is small, "a large absolute number of felons . . . are released .... " Id. at
908 n.6.
245. Id. at 908.
246. "No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet
been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent ef-
fect . . . ." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22 (1976).
247. "Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed
police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 225 (1971).
248. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974) ("[a]ny incremental
deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best.").
249. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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supported by overwhelming untainted evidence" or is other-
wise not affected by error. 5'
3. Civil suits for damages
Victims of illegal searches and seizures may sue for damag-
es resulting from violations of Fourth Amendment rights ei-
ther under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or directly under the Fourth
Amendment.5 Such suits are limited, however, by the rule
that the officer has qualified immunity. In other words, a rea-
sonable belief that the search or seizure was constitutional is a
defense.'
III. CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment analysis proceeds in three steps. First,
preliminary requirements (jurisdiction, justiciability, and gov-
ernment action) must be met. Second, the merits of the Fourth
Amendment claim must be considered, including the threshold
question whether a search or seizure occurred invading
claimant's rights and, if so, the central question whether the
government complied with the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause, warrant, and reasonableness requirements. Third, ques-
tions concerning remedies must be addressed. If one ap-
proaches Fourth Amendment issues by using this analytical
model, the chances of reaching the correct result will hopefully
be increased.
250. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
251. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
252. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
253. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The test is objective reason-
ableness; the officer's subjective good faith is not an issue.
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APPENDIX
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to
set forth the following, more detailed outline of Fourth
Amendment analysis.
FOURTH AMENDMENT; BASIC ANALYSIS
I. Have the preliminary requirements been met?
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: Was the Fourth Amendment violated?
A. Is the Fourth Amendment applicable?
1. Did a search or seizure occur?
a. Search (invasion of reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy)?
b. Seizure of person (reasonable person
would not feel free to leave)?
c. Seizure of thing (interference with pos-
session)?
2. Did the search or seizure invade claimant's
personal rights?
B. Have Fourth Amendment requirements been
met?
1. Compliance with probable cause require-
ment?
a. General rule: searches and seizures with-
out probable cause violate the Fourth
Amendment
b. Exceptions
1) Limited intrusions
2) Special needs
a) Public schools
b) Government workplaces
c) Probationers and parolees
d) Closely regulated industries
e) Health and safety inspections
f) Inventories
g) Drug tests
h) Other special needs
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3) Border searches
4) Consent searches
5) Searches incident to arrest
2. Compliance with warrant requirement
a. Was a warrant required?
1) Search
a) General rule: search warrant is
required
b) Exceptions
(1) Limited intrusions
(2) Special needs
(3) Border searches
(4) Consent searches
(5) Searches incident to arrest
(6) Exigent circumstances, i.e.,
threat of
(a) Physical harm,
(b) Loss of evidence, or
(c) Escape
(7) Automobile exception
2) Seizure of person
a) General rule: warrant is not re-
quired
b) Exceptions
(1) Entry of home, or
(2) Misdemeanor not commit-
ted in presence of arrest-
ing officer
3) Seizure of thing
a) General rule: warrant is not re-
quired if thing seized is in
plain view
3. Compliance with reasonableness require-
ment
a. Was the search or seizure justified in its
inception?
1) Particularity requirement
2) Exceptions to particularity require-
ment
a) Minimal intrusions
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(1) Traffic stops at fixed
checkpoints near borders
or
(2) Stops at drunk driving
checkpoints
(3) Orders to step out of
stopped cars
b) Administrative guidelines suffi-
cient to control officer's dis-
cretion
c) Consent searches
d) Border stops and searches
b. Was the search or seizure justified in its
scope?
c. Did the need (government interest)out-
weigh the harm (intrusion)? Balancing
test focusing on the totality of the cir-
cumstances
d. Were other reasonableness tests met?
1) Knock and announce requirement
2) Rule against general searches and
seizures
III. Remedies
A. Exclusionary rule
1. Prosecution's case-in-chief
a. General rule: evidence resulting from
unconstitutional search is inadmissible
b. Exceptions
1) Reasonable reliance on warrant
2) Reasonable reliance on unconstitu-
tional statute
2. Other uses: evidence is admissible if cost of
exclusion outweighs incremental deterrent
effect
a. Other uses in criminal prosecution
1) Grand jury proceedings (admissible)
2) Impeachment exception
a) Admissible to impeach defen-
dant
b) Not admissible to impeach
other defense witnesses
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b. Uses outside criminal prosecution
1) Forfeiture proceedings (inadmissi-
ble)
2) Civil tax proceedings (admissible)
3) Deportation proceedings (admissi-
ble)
B. Harmless error rule: erroneous admission of
illegally obtained evidence does not require re-
versal if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
C. Civil suit for damages (qualified immunity de-
fense)
